






DOI (link to publisher)
10.1093/oso/9780198798200.003.0039
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Aalberts, T. E. (2018). Sovereign marks. In J. Hohmann, & D. Joyce (Eds.), International Law's Objects:
Emergence, Encounter and Erasure (pp. 453-462). Oxford University press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798200.003.0039
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 14. Sep. 2021
453
Sovereign Marks. Tanja Aalberts.





This chapter analyses a treaty made on behalf of the Association Internationale du 
Congo (the infamous private company of King Leopold II of Belgium) with Roi 
Né- Do’ucoula, (one of ) the King(s) of Boma on 19 April 1884. Despite the popular 
imaginary of the continent as terra nullius— no man’s land— treaty making with 
African Chiefs was an important legal instrument to regulate the Scramble for 
Africa in the nineteenth century. Whereas legal analysis would usually focus on the 
content of the treaty and its provisions to establish legal facts, this chapter moves 
the attention to the signatures at the bottom. I will argue that they constitute an 
important object of international law, as they provide a counter- narrative to the 
popular standard of civilization as the founding doctrine of the Family of Nations 
in the nineteenth century. 
While often neglected, signatures constitute a crucial part of the practice of inter-
national law— for one thing, without a signature the piece of paper is a text, a fairy 
tale, a desire or ambition, but not a treaty with legal consequences. Or more pre-
cisely: without signatures (in the plural), because as a source of international law a 
treaty consists of an agreement between two or more actors (primarily states) on the 
international scene. Apart from validating the text as a legal document with binding 
obligations for the parties involved, the signatures thus also say something about the 
legal status of the signatories: not everyone is able or authorized to enter into a treaty. 
The question of international legal personality (who counts as an actor under inter-
national law, and has legal capacity) thus is a matter of identifying who is included— 
as well as who is excluded— from the Family of Nations; in other words, it concerns 
the boundaries of international society. This question was a notoriously pertinent 
one in late nineteenth- century legal doctrine, because of an exclusionary vision of 
the Family of Nations, consisting only of civilized— European Christian— states.
This chapter analyses what the signature of roi Né- Do’ucoula (and similar signa-
tures on numerous treaties of cession) as an object of international law tells us about 
the modern international legal order as it emerged in the late nineteenth century. 
While colonial treaties have been criticized as rhetorical window- dressing and im-
perialist violence, from a performative perspective something more interesting is at 
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play. Such a perspective looks at law as not merely a body of rules, but as a productive 
practice, which creates the subjects it seeks to regulate (or exclude).1 As single docu-
ments, these treaties are particularly interesting in terms of the hybrid processes 
of subjectification that they enact. By zooming in on the signatures, this chapter 
discusses how they at once apparently illustrate the standard of civilization and   
Fig 33.1 Copy of the treaty (Traité) between Alexandre Delcommune (representing 
l’Association Internationale du Congo) and King Né- Do’ucoula, 19 April 1884. The ori-
ginal is available in the archives of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels: File 
A1/ 1377, document 1/ 2/ a
1 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (Routledge 1993); François 
Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline, and the Law’ (1990) 30 Representations 138.
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undermine its performance as the fundament for the Family of Nations. In other 
words, as objects of international law the signatures— or rather marks or crosses— 
embody at the same time the condition of possibility of the nineteenth- century 
international legal order, and undermine its defining framework and thus constitute 
its condition of impossibility.
Colonialism as a Legal Enterprise
The popular discourse of the Scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century is 
based on the image of Africa as terra nullius, as no man’s land, visualized also by 
numerous maps with vast white spaces that— somewhat ironically— represent the 
‘dark continent’ or the ‘heart of darkness’, as two contemporary authors describe it 
(Henry Morton Stanley and Joseph Conrad respectively, though the second with a 
metaphorical and critical twist that the explorer misses).2 Exploration, map- making, 
and legal ordering went hand in hand, quite literally as in many cases explorers, in-
cluding famous pioneers like Stanley and Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, did all at once. 
These explorers had a crucial political and legal role in the colonial enterprise. As em-
ployees of colonial governments they were all- rounders who combined their travels 
and map- making practices with drafting treaties of trade, protection, and cession 
with African chiefs. The most well- known example is indeed Stanley, who claims to 
have concluded more than 400 treaties in the service of King Leopold II of Belgium 
and the Association Internationale du Congo as his private enterprise.
An important background condition for understanding how colonialism op-
erated as a legal enterprise, is the emergence of positivism as the leading legal doc-
trine and foundation for the international legal order in the nineteenth century. 
Legal positivism recognizes law as a man- made institution, grounded in rules 
formulated and agreed upon by sovereign states, as the key subjects of inter-
national law, to regulate their interactions. Given their foundation in state con-
sent, treaties count as one of the most important sources of international law in 
positivist jurisprudence.3 Treaties in turn, treaties are indicators of the legal cap-
acity of their signatories, and treaty making can hence involve an act of ‘implied 
recognition’ of an entity’s status as a subject and legal person under international 
law.4 Crucially, in the late nineteenth century the concept of international legal 
2 Henry M Stanley, The Congo and the Founding of its Free State: A Story of Work and Exploration 
(Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington 1885); Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness and The Secret 
Sharer (Blackwood’s 1902).
3 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (7th ed, CUP 2014).
4 According to modern legal doctrine, only comprehensive bilateral treaties could imply a ‘proper 
mode of recognition [of a state] in all cases in which there is no reasonable doubt as to the intention of 
the parties’ (Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (CUP 1947) 378). Informal bilateral 
relations or for instance accession to multilateral treaties do not qualify. Whereas the current treaty can 
hardly be called comprehensive, what I am interested in here is not the specific recognition of a par-
ticular entity as a state, but the more general practice that validating a piece of paper with a signature 
implies that the signatories have the legal capacity to do so; otherwise the paper cannot become a treaty 
and function as legal title in the Scramble for Africa.
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personality was based on an absolute distinction between civilized and uncivil-
ized nations—the infamous standard of civilization—as another component and 
mechanism of contemporary legal positivism. The boundaries of international 
society were drawn between European states as the Family of Nations on the one 
hand, and barbarian nations and savage entities, on the other. In particular the 
latter group— which included notably the peoples of the African continent— 
lacked any status, rights, and duties within the international legal order. However, 
this exclusion of savage entities on the basis of the standard of civilization is hard 
to reconcile with treaty- making practices as an important trope in the European 
race to show better legal titles to colonial territory.5 The colonial signatures em-
body this dual practice of in/exclusion, as will be elaborated later. As such, they 
rendered the boundaries of (the exclusive) international society instable and dis-
rupted the international legal order that they at the same time legitimized.6
The Scramble for Congo by Treaty
So what do these treaties look like? There are different types. While some colonial 
governments allegedly worked with standard forms, produced in the homeland of 
the colonial power,7 other treaties seem to have been produced on the spot, with 
different, more individual, formulations, even if there are also striking similarities 
in terms across various treaties.8 Most treaties are in the mother language of the co-
lonial power, and include a reference to (and signatures of ) present interpreters.9 
Some treaties are rather formalized, on official paper with a letterhead, a long list 
of articles and in careful handwriting; others have clearly been produced in haste 
and look more informal.10 The treaty under scrutiny here is a clear example of the 
latter. As mentioned, it is a treaty made on behalf of the Association Internationale du 
Congo (AIC). The Association was a society founded on 17 November 1879 by King 
5 See also Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP 
2005); Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 
1870- 1960 (CUP 2001) Ch 2.
6 Instability in this context should not be read in an immediate sense, but ‘in a historical trajectory 
wherein the very existence of the “other” on the terrain of the international functions as both a con-
straining and an enabling force’ (Vivienne Jabri, ‘Disarming norms: postcolonial agency and the consti-
tution of the international’ (2014) 6 International Theory 372, 384).
7 Henk L Wesseling, Verdeel en Heers. De Deling van Afrika 1880- 1914 (Aula 2003). While there are 
few if any examples of such forms left in the archives, there is a document with confidential instructions 
to Stanley for draft formulations for (i) a political treaty; and (ii) a treaty for territorial cession (in English 
and French), dated 1 November 1882 (file SA.4777, available in the archives of the Afrikamuseum, 
Tervuren, Belgium). The treaty with the King of Boma resembles the second template.
8 For a classic and comprehensive study of these practices and comparison of different colonial 
powers, see Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, The European- African Confrontation. A  Study in Treaty 
Making (AW Sijthoff 1973).
9 Exceptions are treaties with Arabic speaking rulers, for which there seems to have been a practice 
of drafting two versions— in European and in Arabic.
10 Based on an investigation of the (incomplete) archive with treaties relating to the Congo Free State 




Leopold II of Belgium to further his private interests in obtaining colonial territory 
for commercial and political gains.11 For this purpose, Leopold employed Stanley 
and an army of officers to explore the river Congo, settle stations at its shores, and 
sign treaties with local chiefs to establish a trading monopoly and obtain territory 
and sovereign power.
The treaty is written on a standard sheet of paper, identified as ‘Traité’ in hand-
writing at the top, in quick script or scribbles, with four signatures at the bottom: of 
Alexandre Delcommune (representative of the AIC), of King Né- Do’ucoula, and 
of two interpreters. The treaty consists of only two articles: the first stating that 
‘roi’ Né- Doucoula (whose name is spelled differently at various instances), ‘chef 
indépendent’ of Boma, ‘cède à l’Association Internationale du Congo ses droits de 
souverainité sur tous les territoires soumis à son autorité . . . ’.12 The second article 
states that he has received twenty pieces of fabric in return. As such the treaty is 
exemplary of Leopold’s instructions to Stanley at the time: ‘The treaties must be 
as brief as possible . . . and in a couple of articles must grant us everything’.13 This 
particular treaty is one of series of nine treaties, held together by a piece of rope, 
each identical in terms of their text and provisions, drafted on the same day, but 
concerning different territories, and signed by different kings (who are all identified 
as ‘roi de Boma’).
But what interests me here is not so much the specific content of the legal provi-
sions, but the practice of treaty making as such, and notably the performative sig-
nificance of the signatures or marks. Overall, this treaty seems a perfect illustration 
of what Otto von Bismarck pedantically dismissed as the easy practice ‘ein Stück 
Papier mit Negerkreuzen darunter zu bekommen’14 in Africa. Still, it is not just a 
piece of paper recording random text. Despite its informal looks, it clearly was de-
signed to be something other than a diary note, a memo, or a novella. While there 
are no specific legal requirements of form for the creation of international treaties, 
according to common practice legal contracts contain specific elements that we can 
recognize here too: the treaty is written text, with ‘articles’ containing the elements 
of the agreement, there is reference to interpreters, the identification of place and 
date, and last but not least the signatures of the parties involved (as either right- and 
duty- holders, or as witness to the treaty). In addition to their appearances or guises 
as legal agreements, in diplomatic practice the treaties were respected as legally valid 
amongst the colonial powers themselves, as has been confirmed retrospectively in 
the International Court of Justice’s Western Sahara case (1975).15
11 It was one of four creations by King Leopold II, and successor to the Association Internationale 
Africaine (1876), the Comité d’Études du Haut- Congo (1978), and later transformed into the Congo Free 
State, claimed by Leopold in his personal capacity (1885). Remarkably, the Association was recognized 
as sovereign power by, inter alia, the United States and Germany.
12 ‘The independent chef of Boma cedes to the International Association of Congo his rights of sov-
ereignty over all the territory under his authority’ (translation by the author).
13 Quoted in Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism (Holton 
Mifflin Company 1999) 71.
14 ‘To obtain a piece of paper with a Negro cross underneath’ (translation by the author). Quoted in 
Wesseling (n 7) 162.
15 Western Sahara case (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 80.
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At the same time, critics have rightly problematized the conditions under which 
the treaties were drafted. Can we assume ‘free consent’? Did the chiefs have any under-
standing of what they were doing by putting the(ir) cross on this piece of paper? Did they 
have a conception of the ‘treaty’ as a legal instrument which entails mutual obligations 
to signatory parties? Can you cede or transfer sovereignty, if this is a purely European 
concept, of which the native could not have had a conception?16 Interestingly, these 
arguments are put forward by postcolonial critics as well as contemporary lawyers sup-
portive of the colonial enterprise, such as John Westlake, a key publicist on the colonial 
issue at the prominent Institute de Droit International. Whereas the former criticize 
the treaties as a matter of window dressing, organized hypocrisy, and mere expediency 
to pursue imperialist projects (ie based on the unequal content and conditions of its 
drafting),17 Westlake seems to have trouble with the treaty- making practices precisely 
because of the performative aspects of the signatures, as will be elaborated later.
The criticism of the colonial treaties as a form of organized hypocrisy is supported 
by the fact that the imperial legal repertoire was directed at regulating the intra- 
European rivalries, rather than concerned with legitimating the colonial endeavours 
vis a vis its direct objects. For instance, the treaties played an important role as cur-
rency at the 1885 Berlin conference on the European trade and civilising mission 
in Africa, to which the Indigenous rulers themselves were not invited.18 In other 
words, these legal practices served first and foremost a political function amongst 
European powers, rather than a legal function between colonizers and colonized. 
However, in my view this distinction between endogenous and exogenous func-
tions19 might suggest too strong a separation of the inside of the Family of Nations, 
from its uncivilized outside. The signatures indeed suggest that such a perspective 
neglects the legal performativity of treaty- making practices, the relationality they 
imply between colonizer and colonized as parties to a treaty, as well as the inherent 
tension in the modern legal order that these practices produce. So let’s now zoom in 
on the signatures.
‘Negerkreuzen’ as Sovereign Marks
Comparing the four signatures on the treaty, at first glance we seem to have a perfect 
visualization of the standard of civilization: the powerful, flamboyant signature of 
16 Interestingly, treaty making was often accompanied by a ritual of establishing blood brotherhood 
(pacte de sang). Indeed, in his travel diaries on his work for Leopold, Stanley (n 2) more frequently men-
tions the ceremonies for blood brotherhood than the 400 or so treaties that he allegedly drafted. Several 
authors conclude from these solemnities that the African chiefs were in any case aware of the binding 
nature of the treaties. See Alexandrowicz (n 8) 51– 3, who quotes the explorers Sir Frederick Lugard and 
Dr Karl Peters in this regard.
17 Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self- Determination 
in International Law (U Minnesota Press 1996).
18 Stephen Humphreys, ‘Laboratories of Statehood:  Legal Intervention in Colonial Africa and 
Today’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 475.
19 Karin Mickelson, ‘The Maps of International Law: Perceptions of Nature in the Classification of 
Territory’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law 621.
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Delcommune stands in stark contrast with the signatures of King Né- Do’ucoula 
and the local interpreters. One can imagine the latter persons holding a pen for the 
first time. Interestingly, in some copies of other treaties reference is made to ‘their 
signature or mark’ behind the fully spelled names of the African signatories. Yet, it is 
this very mark that seems to lie behind Westlake’s unease with the treaties. While the 
treaties provided a proper legal title to the colonial enterprise, in line with the legal 
positivist doctrine, they also implied a status of the chiefs that— according to the 
same doctrine— these savage rulers could not have. The very ‘cross’ by which they at 
once officially ceded their sovereignty to the colonial powers also implied they had 
the legal status as sovereigns to do so. After all, the right to enter into international 
treaties— including ones that restrict sovereign power— is an attribute of state sover-
eignty.20 Indeed, ‘the natives’ right to dispose freely of themselves’ was an important 
element of the repertoire of juridical technologies of colonial rule.21 Whereas this 
seems to make natives complicit to their own transformation into objects of colon-
ization, from a performative perspective something else is going on at the same time. 
For, as previously mentioned, in the positivist scheme, treaty making implies recog-
nition of an entity’s status under international law. The ambiguity is nicely captured 
by Oppenheim in his observation that
[C] ession of territory made to a member of the family of nations by a State as yet out-
side that family is real cession and a concern of the Law of Nations, since such State 
becomes through the treaty of cession in some respects a member of that family. . . . No 
other explanation of these and similar facts [such as that these non- sovereign entities 
engaged in sovereign behaviour] can be given except that these [non- European] not- 
full Sovereign States are in some way or another International Persons and subjects of 
International Law.22
It is not the aim here to provide a full historical record of colonial treaty making 
as such, or a legal analysis of the treaty as a repository of legal facts (focusing on 
the content of the treaty provisions). Instead the final section will analyse the co-
lonial signatures as objects of international law from a performative perspective. 
Jacques Derrida’s discussion of the performativity of the sign provides us with 
interesting pointers for conceptualizing and theorizing Indigenous presence and 
agency (circumscribed as that obviously was) in relation to the international 
legal order.
Performative Objects
From a performative perspective, we can analyse the signature as a legal tech-
nology, which not only produces the signatory as a sovereign subject and legal 
20 As later confirmed in the SS Wimbledon case, PCIJ Series A [1923] No 1, 25.
21 As stated by the American representative to the Berlin Conference, Mr Kasson. His statement 
was included in a separate declaration, in an appendix to the Protocol of the Final Act of the Berlin 
Conference, as his statement was not endorsed by the other signatory parties (Alexandrowicz (n 8) 47).
22 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise. Volume I (Longmans, Green and Co 1912) 86.
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person— ‘invents the signer’ in Derridian terms— but in the case of colonial 
treaties also marks the aporia, as a self- engendered paradox, of the Family of 
Nations as the European, civilized core of a natural and fully constituted legal 
order. This we can further unpack by drawing upon Derrida’s reflections on the 
signature as an iteration mark, that renders the subject present and absent at the 
same time.
As a written sign, a signature is a ‘mark that subsists, one which does not exhaust 
itself in the moment of its inscription and which can give rise to an iteration in the 
absence and beyond the presence of the empirically determined subject who, in 
a given context, has emitted or produced it’.23 The text or document as such car-
ries its own force and erases the subject it has produced. In a sense, this is the very 
function of the signature, to create a border between the will of its maker and the 
document that is made and the legal fact that is created. Yet, the question is if the 
signature can succeed in its performance or signification in this way, or instead car-
ries the seeds of its own failure.24
The erasure of non- European subjectivity, and the presentation of the signatories 
as objects without agency, is a familiar postcolonial critique of the treaty- making 
practices: colonial treaties (whether of protection, consular jurisdiction, and extra-
territoriality, or cession) ‘took the form of agreements between [equal] sovereign 
States, the substance of which however was to deny any such pretension’.25 The 
emphasis in these critiques is on the exclusionary and unequal practices of modern 
international law. But at the same time, the content (and the ridicule implied in 
exchanging sovereignty rights indefinitely for twenty pieces of cloth) cannot com-
pletely obliterate the form, in particular given the importance and role of treaty 
making as a foundational practice of legal positivism. In the case of the colonial 
treaties, it is the relationality between the extravagant signature of the colonizer 
and the crosses of the Indigenous chiefs that testifies to its failure, the aporia of the 
contemporary legal order insofar as it undermines or dismantles its own structure.
The ambiguous legal status of the ‘natives’ as ‘savages’ as on the one hand ex-
cluded from the contemporary Family of Nations, yet at the same time signa-
tories to international treaties (as a key source and foundational practice of the 
modern international legal order) was problematic for the positivist projection 
of a coherent and unitary system. But a Derridian reading reveals an even more 
fundamental problem that the crosses constitute for the legal order. They mark 
the embodied presence of the colonial subject, who remains visible through its 
signature: the signature captures and marks a ‘having- been present in a past now’ 
which becomes a ‘now in general’ (maintenance, ‘the transcendental form of 
23 Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’ in Jacques Derrida (ed), Limited Inc (Northwestern 
UP 1988) 9.
24 Connal Parsley, ‘Seasons in the Abyss:  Reading the Void in Cubillo’ in Anne Orford (ed), 
International Law and its Others (CUP 2006) 107, 113.
25 Matthew Craven, ‘Statehood, Self- Determination, and Recognition’ in Malcolm D Evans (ed), 
International Law (3rd ed, OUP 2010) 213.
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presentness’).26 So even though the content of many of the treaties de jure erased 
both status and rights of the Indigenous rulers, and reduced them to objects of 
colonization, there is the ghost of the Indigenous signatory that authorized this 
title to territory, which not only undermines the very logic of the standard of civ-
ilization as a marker of legality, but also the positivist self- image of the European 
core as a unitary and complete order by and of itself. The reality of this ghost 
transpires also from the legal discussion during the process of decolonization, on 
whether the sovereign statehood of the postcolonies concerned an ‘originary’ or 
‘derivative title’ (in other words, did they obtain sovereignty for the first time, or 
was decolonization a return to their original condition as sovereigns before they 
were colonized?).27
For the civilized core itself, sovereign statehood was presented as the natural con-
dition of European entities, the origins of which are ‘beyond history and inquiry’.28 
However, as Anghie has argued persuasively, it is in the colonial encounter that the 
Europeans are produced as the original sovereign powers who command and im-
pose their universal law vis a vis the uncivilized, who in turn fall within the orbit of 
international law and are recognized as partially or proto- sovereign for the purpose 
of their own subjugation, yet are produced as outlaws who need to be disciplined 
and civilized via sanctions and coercions at the same time: ‘The primitive was not so 
much outside international law awaiting its ordering ministrations, but within the 
very heart of the discipline, and the subsequent efforts of the international jurist to 
define and manage the primitive served to conceal this fundamental connection.’29 
Anghie then highlights the erasure of non- European identities: ‘[T] he methodology 
used by positivists to examine these treaties had the paradoxical effect of erasing the 
non- European side of the treaty even when claiming to identify and give effect to the 
intentions of that party’.30
The fact that there was no unified position amongst contemporary lawyers and 
legal publicists, and— crucially— that their discussions do not focus on the content 
of the treaties and their legal provisions, but on the treaty- making practices as such, 
shows the fundamental nature of the controversy. It is not just about the status of 
the Indigenous chiefs and the boundaries of international society, but about the 
foundation of the contemporary legal order based on the positivist paradigm, and 
the Family of Nations itself. The treaty- making practices were both a condition of 
possibility of modern international law, yet at the same time— in the case of colo-
nial treaties— its condition of impossibility, and a potential rupture for the posi-
tivist self- image and European legal order based on the standard of civilization. 
26 Derrida (n 23) 20. At the same time, Derrida questions this illusion of the signature as an absolute 
originary event, which is based on the assumption of a singular intentional present that is captured within 
the mark itself: ‘[T] he condition of possibility of [the] effects [of signature] is simultaneously . . . the con-
dition of their impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous purity.’ (ibid).
27 Charles H Alexandrowicz, ‘New and Original States: The Issue of Reversion to Sovereignty’ 
(1969) 45 International Affairs 465. This was not only an academic discussion, as illustrated by the 
Western Sahara case judgment (n 15).
28 Anghie (n 5) 102. 29 ibid 65. 30 ibid 71.
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The embodied presence of colonial subjects through their signatory marks destabil-
izes the European international order as ‘always already’ present and complete, and 
reveals the role of colonial subjects as not just its constitutive outside, but inside. 
As such the signatures can be identified as objects of international law, that at once 
produced the boundaries of (the exclusive European) international society and ren-
dered them instable through its disruptive potential of the positivist projection of 
that very order.
